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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge 
 In Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of County 
of Burlington,1 the Supreme Court held that all arrestees who 
are committed to the general population of a detention center 
may be subject to a close visual inspection while undressed.  
Today we are asked whether Florence applies to juvenile 
offenders admitted to the general population of a juvenile 
detention center.  We hold that it does.   
I. Background 
 At twelve years old, J.B. skillfully constructed a 
homemade flame thrower using PVC pipe, a lighter, and 
spray paint.  He then activated this contraption in his 
backyard.  The flame thrower shot flames 1-2 feet in length, 
attracting the attention of several neighborhood girls, ages 7-
11, who were playing nearby.  The girls told their babysitter 
about the flames, and the babysitter asked J.B. to stop playing 
with the flame thrower as it was unsafe.  Later that day, the 
same girls went to J.B.’s front yard and began teasing him.  
This teasing resulted in hand-to-hand fighting between J.B. 
and at least two of the girls.  During this conflict, J.B. 
brandished a homemade knife, approximately 5 inches long, 
which he held over one of the girl’s heads, stating that he was 
stronger than her, “so [he could] kill [her] and over power 
                                              
1 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2011). 
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[her].”2  The girls also alleged that J.B. directly threatened to 
kill them.  After J.B. threatened the girls and displayed the 
knife, they left his yard and told their babysitter what had 
transpired. 
  The father of two of the girls involved, called the state 
police that evening to report the incident.  Trooper James 
Fassnacht received notice of this report and interviewed the 
father, all of the young girls, and J.B.  J.B. admitted to 
threatening to break one of the girl’s arms and to holding a 
homemade knife over another girl’s head.3  Fassnacht 
informed J.B.’s father that charges of terroristic threats and 
summary harassment would be filed at a later date.  Three 
weeks later, Fassnacht filed a juvenile allegation against J.B. 
with Lancaster County Juvenile Probation Intake Officer 
Carole Trostle.  Trostle then informed Fassnacht that 
Lancaster County Juvenile Probation was ordering J.B.’s 
detention due to the seriousness of the charges.   
 J.B.’s parents surrendered J.B. to the Pennsylvania 
State Police barracks in Ephrata, Pennsylvania.  He was then 
transported to the Lancaster County Youth Intervention 
Center (“LYIC”).  Upon arrival, J.B. was processed and 
subjected to a strip search pursuant to LYIC policy.4  This 
                                              
2 App. 8.   
3 App. 8. 
4 The LYIC policy is not a blanket strip search policy, per se.  
Rather, facility officials complete an “Unclothed Search 
Checklist,” to determine whether a new detainee should be 
strip searched.  During a deposition, however, one LYIC 
official stated that, in practice, all new detainees are strip 
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policy states that such searches are conducted to look for 
signs of “injuries, markings, skin conditions, signs of abuse, 
or further contraband.”5  Officers are instructed to wear 
rubber gloves, refrain from touching the detainee, and to 
bring the detainee “to the shower area and close the privacy 
curtain in order to obstruct the transporters’ view.”6  During 
the strip search, J.B. stood behind a curtain so that only the 
officer conducting the search could observe him as he 
removed his clothing.  J.B. removed his pants and underwear 
for approximately ninety seconds.  In addition, J.B. was asked 
to turn around, drop his pants and underwear, bend over, 
spread his buttocks, and cough.  J.B. was detained from 
Friday, July 24 through Monday, July 27, 2009, when, after a 
hearing, he was released to his parents.  In October 2009, a 
juvenile hearing was held and J.B. did not contest the charges 
of terroristic threats and summary harassment.  Instead, he 
entered into a consent decree by which he agreed to write a 
letter of apology to his victims and abide by other probation 
requirements in exchange for the opportunity to have his 
record expunged.          
 In February 2012, Plaintiffs Thomas and Janet 
Benjamin brought suit on behalf of J.B., asserting various 
civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, 
unreasonable search and seizure, false imprisonment, and 
violations of due process against various prison officials.  
                                                                                                     
searched.  The official stated that he could not recall a new 
detainee not having been strip searched.  App. 296-97. 
5 App. 355. 
6 App. 354. 
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Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the 
District Court granted in part and denied in part.  Of 
particular relevance, the District Court rejected Defendants’ 
argument that Plaintiffs’ unreasonable search claims failed 
pursuant to Florence.  The District Court held that Florence 
does not apply to juveniles and thus it did not affect the 
legality of J.B.’s search.  In so holding, the District Court 
reasoned that the facts of Florence addressed strip searches of 
adult inmates and made no reference to juvenile detainees.  
Accordingly, the District Court proceeded by analyzing J.B.’s 
search under a reasonable suspicion standard, as articulated in 
Bell v. Wolfish.7  Because the District Court found there to be 
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the detention 
facility officials possessed a reasonable suspicion to strip 
search J.B., it denied summary judgment on this claim.  The 
District Court was particularly bothered by the three-week 
time lapse between the incident and J.B.’s detention.  Under 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the District Court then certified the 
question of whether Florence applies to all juveniles being 
committed to a juvenile detention facility.8 
                                              
7 441 U.S. 520, 558-59 (1979). 
8 We have jurisdiction over this interlocutory order pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  “[A] non-final order may only be 
certified for interlocutory appeal if the court determines it: (1) 
involves a ‘controlling question of law,’ (2) for which there is 
‘substantial ground for difference of opinion,’ and (3) which 
may ‘materially advance the ultimate termination of the 
litigation’ if appealed immediately.”  Knipe v. SmithKline 





 In Florence, the petitioner was arrested on an 
outstanding bench warrant after a traffic stop.  He was 
subjected to a strip search upon admission to jail where he 
was required to lift his genitals, turn around, and cough while 
squatting.  The petitioner was released the next day after the 
charges against him were dismissed.  Following this incident, 
petitioner sued the governmental entities that operated the jail 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, maintaining that people arrested for 
minor offenses “could not be required to remove their 
clothing and expose the most private areas of their bodies to 
close visual inspection as a routine part of the intake 
process.”9  The Supreme Court disagreed.  At the outset, the 
Supreme Court held that “[c]orrectional officials have a 
legitimate interest, indeed a responsibility, to ensure that jails 
are not made less secure by reason of what new detainees 
may carry in on their bodies.  Facility personnel, other 
inmates, and the new detainee himself or herself may be in 
danger if these threats are introduced into the jail 
population.”10     
 Referring to jail “in a broad sense to include prisons 
and other detention facilities,”11 the Supreme Court held that 
                                                                                                     
(quoting Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 754 (3d 
Cir. 1974)).     
9 Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1514-15. 
10 Id. at 1513. 
11 Id.  
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“[c]orrectional officials have a significant interest in 
conducting a thorough search as a standard part of the intake 
process.”12  The Court identified three main risks justifying a 
blanket strip search policy in such facilities: (1) the danger of 
introducing contagious infections and diseases; (2) the 
increasing number of gang members who go through the 
intake process; and (3) the detection of contraband, i.e., any 
unauthorized item, concealed by new detainees.13  The 
necessity of a strip search to detect contraband is clear.  The 
Supreme Court clarified, however, that a strip search is also 
necessary to detect diseases and wounds and identify 
potential gang members.  With respect to diseases and 
wounds, the Court explained that “[p]ersons just arrested may 
have wounds or other injuries requiring immediate medical 
attention.  It may be difficult to identify and treat these 
problems until detainees remove their clothes for a visual 
inspection.”14  Similarly, identifying potential gang 
affiliations is critical before a detainee enters the general 
population, where “[f]ights among feuding gangs can be 
deadly, and the officers who must maintain order are put in 
harm’s way.”15  Thus, a strip search allows corrections 
officers to inspect for certain tattoos and other signs of gang 
affiliation, which facilitates “[t]he identification and isolation 
of gang members before they are admitted.”16  As a result of 
                                              
12 Id. at 1518. 
13 Id. at 1518-19. 
14 Id. at 1518. 
15 Id. at 1518-19. 
16 Id. at 1519. 
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these risks, the Court held that “[i]t is not surprising that 
correctional officials have sought to perform thorough 
searches at intake . . . . Jails are often crowded, unsanitary, 
and dangerous places.  There is a substantial interest in 
preventing any new inmate . . . from putting all who live or 
work at these institutions at even greater risk when he is 
admitted.”17 
 While conceding that correctional officials must be 
allowed to conduct an effective search during the intake 
process, the petitioner in Florence asserted that an invasive 
strip search was not necessary where the detainee had not 
been arrested for a serious crime or for any offense involving 
a weapon or drugs.  The Supreme Court rejected this 
argument holding that the petitioner’s standard would be 
unworkable given the realities of prison administration.  
Stating that “jails can be even more dangerous than prisons 
because officials there know so little about the people they 
admit at the outset,” the Supreme Court explained that 
officers responsible for the intake process often lack access to 
criminal history records, and even those records can be 
inaccurate or incomplete.18  Such an individualized inquiry 
may also lead to discriminatory application by officers who 
“would not be well equipped to make any of these legal 
determinations during the pressures of the intake process.”19     
 Thus, the Supreme Court explained that “[i]n 
addressing this type of constitutional claim courts must defer 
                                              
17 Id. at 1520. 
18 Id. at 1521. 
19 Id. at 1522. 
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to the judgment of correctional officials unless the record 
contains substantial evidence showing their policies are an 
unnecessary or unjustified response to problems of jail 
security.”20  Emphasizing prison officials’ need for discretion, 
the Court stated that “[m]aintaining safety and order at these 
institutions requires the expertise of correctional officials, 
who must have substantial discretion to devise reasonable 
solutions to the problems they face.”21  Further, the Court 
emphasized the deference owed to correctional officers and 
stated “a regulation impinging on an inmate’s constitutional 
rights must be upheld ‘if it is reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests.’”22  Strip searches of all detainees prior 
to admission to the general population of a jail serves such 
penological interests. 
 The majority opinion, however, left open the 
possibility of exceptions to this holding.  For example, the 
majority acknowledged that this case did not require it to rule 
on the types of searches that would be reasonable where a 
detainee would be held without assignment to the general jail 
population and without substantial contact with other 
detainees.23  In such a situation, “[t]he accommodations . . . 
may diminish the need to conduct some aspects of the 
searches at issue.”24  Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts wrote 
                                              
20 Id. at 1513-14. 
21 Id. at 1515. 
22 Id. (quoting Turner, 107 S. Ct. 2254). 
23 Id. at 1522. 
24 Id. at 1523. 
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separately in a concurrence to emphasize that “the Court does 
not foreclose the possibility of an exception to the rule it 
announces.”25  Because “factual nuances [did not] play a 
significant role” in Florence, Chief Justice Roberts 
admonished that “[t]he Court is nonetheless wise to leave 
open the possibility of exceptions, to ensure that we ‘not 
embarrass the future.’”26  In another concurrence, Justice 
Alito echoed Chief Justice Roberts’s sentiments, stating “[i]t 
is important to note, however, that the Court does not hold 
that it is always reasonable to conduct a full strip search of an 
arrestee whose detention has not been reviewed by a judicial 
officer and who could be held in available facilities apart 
from the general population.”27   
 Relying on the importance of deference to correctional 
officials, Florence permitted strip searches of all detainees 
admitted to the general population of a detention facility.  On 
balance, the Court held that the institutional security risks 
outweighed any constitutional right of detainees to be free 
from such strip searches.   
B. Florence Applies to Juvenile Detainees 
 This is a case of first impression in this Circuit and all 
others.28  We must determine whether the Supreme Court’s 
                                              
25 Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
26 Id. (quoting Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 
300 (1944)).  
27 Id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring). 
28 The Sixth Circuit had occasion to consider the applicability 
of Florence to juvenile offenders in T.S. v. Doe, 742 F.3d 632 
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holding in Florence extends to juvenile detainees.  Analogous 
to Florence, we must balance a juvenile detainee’s privacy 
interest with the risks to their well-being and the institutional 
security risks in not performing such searches.     
 At the outset, we acknowledge that “[a] strip search 
with body-cavity inspection is the practice that ‘instinctively’ 
                                                                                                     
(2014).  There, two juveniles were arrested for underage 
drinking and brought to a juvenile detention center.  Upon 
their arrival, the juveniles were subjected to a strip search per 
the detention center’s normal intake procedures.  The Sixth 
Circuit granted qualified immunity, holding that the right of 
juvenile detainees to be free from strip searches was not 
clearly established at the time.  It, however, rested this 
decision less on the applicability of Florence and more on the 
rationale of N.G. v. Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(upholding a strip search of juvenile detainees under the 
special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment) and 
Smook v. Minnehaha County, 457 F.3d 806 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(same).  According to the Sixth Circuit, “[i]f this case 
involved adult detainees, Florence clearly holds that there 
would be no constitutional violation.  Here, however, 
Florence does not squarely address the constitutional issue, so 
that we could dispose of the merits of this case with nothing 
more than a citation.”  T.S., 742 F.3d at 637.  Thus, the Sixth 
Circuit failed to rule explicitly one way or the other on the 
applicability of Florence to juveniles.  In dicta, the Sixth 
Circuit expressed concern “that juvenile and adult detainees 
are subject to the same rules.”  Id.   
13 
 
has given the Supreme Court ‘the most pause.’”29  Our sister 
Circuits have recognized that strip searches are “a serious 
intrusion upon personal rights”30; “an offense to the dignity of 
the individual”31; and “demeaning, dehumanizing, 
undignified, humiliating, terrifying, unpleasant, embarrassing, 
and repulsive.”32  And “since youth . . . is a . . . condition of 
life when a person may be most susceptible . . . . to 
psychological damage . . . [c]hildren are especially 
susceptible to possible traumas from strip searches.”33  Given 
that strip searches impose the substantial risk of 
psychological damage for juvenile detainees, at least one of 
our Sister circuits has found that a juvenile maintains an 
enhanced right to privacy.34  We agree.   
                                              
29 N.G., 382 F.3d at 233 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 
520, 558 (1979)). 
30 Justice v. City of Peachtree City, 961 F.2d 188, 192 (11th 
Cir. 1992). 
31 Burns v. Loranger, 907 F.2d 233, 235 n.6 (1st Cir. 1990). 
32 Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th 
Cir. 1983). 
33 N.G., 382 F.3d at 233 (internal citations and quotation 
omitted). 
34 See Smook, 457 F.3d at 811 (“The juvenile’s interest in 
privacy is greater than an adult’s, the court thought, because 
‘the adverse psychological effect of a strip search is likely to 
be more severe upon a child than an adult, especially a child 
who has been the victim of sexual abuse.” (quoting N.G., 382 
F.3d at 232)); see also N.G., 382 F.3d at 232 (“Strip searches 
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 We do not underestimate the trauma inflicted upon a 
youth subjected to a strip search.  Yet, we must also 
acknowledge the realities of detention, irrespective of age.  
“A detention facility is a unique place fraught with serious 
security dangers.  Smuggling of money, drugs, weapons, and 
other contraband is all too common an occurrence.”35  
Although the Eighth Circuit found an enhanced privacy 
interest for juveniles subjected to strip searches, it approved 
such searches, albeit under a reasonableness inquiry 
balancing the privacy right against other factors, including 
institutional security risks and a facility’s enhanced risk when 
housing minors.  Using Florence as a guidepost, we must 
balance juvenile detainees’ constitutional rights against the 
overarching security interests to determine whether a strip 
search upon admission to the general population of a juvenile 
detention facility “is reasonably related to legitimate 
penological interests.”36   
 Plaintiffs argue that the holding in Florence is limited 
to its facts—that is to say, Florence is limited in application 
to adult detainees.  We disagree for several reasons.  First, the 
institutional security reasons identified in Florence similarly 
implicate juvenile detention centers.  Indeed, juveniles 
represent the same risks to themselves, staff, and other 
                                                                                                     
of children pose the reasonableness inquiry in a context where 
both the interests supporting and opposing such searches 
appear to be greater than with searches of adults confined for 
minor offenses.”). 
35 Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. 
36 Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1515. 
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detainees as adults in similar facilities.  They may carry lice 
or communicable diseases, possess signs of gang 
membership, and attempt to smuggle in contraband.37  Recent 
trends indicate that children are being recruited into gangs at 
a much earlier age—even as early as elementary school.38  
Likewise, juveniles present the risk of smuggling in 
contraband.  This case is exemplary of this fact.  The 
Supreme Court defines contraband broadly in Florence: “The 
textbook definition of the term covers any unauthorized item.  
Everyday items can undermine security if introduced into a 
detention facility.”39  The Court highlights that even 
                                              
37 See N.G., 382 F.3d at 235 (“[C]ontraband such as a knife or 
drugs can pose a hazard to the security of an institution and 
the safety of inmates whether the institution houses adults 
convicted of crimes or juveniles in detention centers.”).   
38 Children and Gangs, Facts for Families, Am. Acad. of 
Child & Adolescent Psychiatry (Sept. 2011), available at 
https://www.aacap.org/App_Themes/AACAP/docs/facts_for_
families/98_children_and_gangs.pdf.  Indeed, gang activity 
has spread from cities to smaller towns and rural areas.  Id.  
“Some children and adolescents are motivated to join a gang 
for a sense of connection or to define a new sense of who they 
are.  Others are motivated by peer pressure, a need to protect 
themselves and their family, because a family member also is 
in a gang, or to make money.”  Id.  Signs of gang affiliation 
may include, “[w]earing clothing of all one type, style, or 
color, or changing appearance with special haircuts, tattoos, 
or other body markings.”  Id.   
39 Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1519. 
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innocuous items such as money, some types of clothing, 
lighters, matches, cell phones, pills, medications, chewing 
gum, and hairpins can present serious risks to prison 
security.40  In this case, J.B. possessed the guile to craft a 
homemade flame thrower and knife—he was clever enough, 
then, even at the young age of twelve, to smuggle contraband 
into the detention facility.   
 In addition, juveniles pose risks unique from those of 
adults as the state acts as the minor’s de facto guardian, or in 
loco parentis,41 during a minor’s detention period.  This status 
creates an enhanced responsibility to screen for signs of 
disease, self-mutilation, or abuse in the home.42  Self-
mutilation is of particular concern—detention may exacerbate 
underlying mental illness, making initial screening imperative 
                                              
40 Id. 
41 “Where the state is exercising some legitimate custodial 
authority over children, its responsibility to act in the place of 
parents (in loco parentis) obliges it to take special care to 
protect those in its charge, and that protection must be 
concerned with dangers from others and self-inflicted harm.  
‘Children . . . are assumed to be subject to the control of their 
parents, and if parental control falters, the State must play its 
part as parens patriae. . . . In this respect, the juvenile’s 
liberty interest may, in appropriate circumstances, be 
subordinated to the State’s parens patriae interest in 
preserving and promoting the welfare of the child.”  N.G., 
382 F.3d at 232 (quoting Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 
(1984)). 
42 N.G., 382 F.3d at 236. 
17 
 
for continued monitoring of the juvenile detainee and to 
ensure he is provided with adequate mental health services 
while detained.  LYIC’s policy regarding strip searches 
underscores these concerns in that officers are instructed to 
observe the body for signs of “injuries, markings, skin 
conditions, signs of abuse, or further contraband.”43 
 There is no easy way to distinguish between juvenile 
and adult detainees in terms of the security risks cited by the 
Supreme Court in Florence.  Indeed, “[a] detention center, 
police station, or jail holding cell is a place ‘fraught with 
serious security dangers.’  These security dangers to the 
institution are the same whether the detainee is a juvenile or 
an adult.”44  Plaintiffs do not argue to the contrary; rather, 
they contend that LYIC could employ less invasive methods 
to achieve the same end.  They suggest using sensitive 
scanning devices and narcotic scanners.  This argument, 
however, was rejected by Florence.  There, the Supreme 
Court explained that “[t]hese [strip search] procedures, 
similar to the ones upheld in Bell, are designed to uncover 
contraband that can go undetected by a patdown, metal 
detector, and other less invasive searches.”45  Indeed, aside 
from failing to detect contraband, less invasive searches may 
leave undetected markings on the body indicating self-
mutilation or potential abuse in the home.   
                                              
43 App. 355. 
44 See Justice v. City of Peachtree City, 961 F.2d at 193 
(quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 559).   
45 Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1520. 
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 Plaintiffs also maintain that while Florence made no 
reference to any type of age classification for purposes of 
strip searches, it is Safford Unified School District #1 v. 
Redding46 that “sets the law for conducting the search of 
children.”47  We are unpersuaded.  In Safford, the Supreme 
Court applied a reasonable suspicion standard to the strip 
search of a juvenile in her school.  Safford may set the law for 
conducting strip searches of children in schools, but it falls far 
short from setting the law for strip searches of juvenile 
detainees.  The Supreme Court’s rationale was not predicated 
on age as much as it focused on the status of the juvenile as a 
schoolchild.  Safford was rooted in the basic notion that 
schoolchildren are entitled to an expectation of privacy.48  A 
strip search of a juvenile by a school administrator lacking 
reasonable suspicion, then, was a repugnant invasion of such 
expectation.  We reiterate, however, that “the prisoner and the 
schoolchild stand in wholly different circumstances.”49  This 
is so because “the need to maintain order in a prison is such 
that prisoners retain no legitimate expectations of privacy in 
their cells.”50  Plaintiffs concede that the security interests at a 
public school may be different from those of a juvenile 
detention center, but they argue that “the goals of the policies 
of both institutions should be to provide a safe environment 
                                              
46 557 U.S. 364 (2009). 
47 J.B. Br. 28. 
48 Safford, 557 U.S. at 374-77. 
49 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 




for juveniles balanced with a respect for dignity and privacy 
for all.”51  We encourage detention centers with blanket strip 
search policies to maintain protocol minimizing the 
embarrassment and indignity of such a search for the juvenile.  
Nevertheless, J.B. did not possess the same reasonable 
expectation of privacy upon admission to the LYIC as did the 
schoolchild in Safford.  That he was twelve years old when 
this occurred does not change that fact.  Accordingly, we find 
that these penological interests outweigh the privacy interests 
of juvenile detainees.  Juvenile detainees present risks both 
similar and unique to those cited in Florence.  At bottom, 
these risks pose significant dangers to the detainee himself, 
other detainees, and juvenile detention center staff.          
 Second, any individualized, reasonable suspicion 
inquiry falters in juvenile detention centers for the same 
reasons it does so in adult facilities.  In Florence, the 
petitioner argued that a detainee arrested for a minor offense 
should be exempt from strip searches upon admission.  The 
Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding the standard 
“unworkable.”52  Such a standard was unworkable because 
“[i]t . . . may be difficult, as a practical matter, to classify 
inmates by their current and prior offenses before the intake 
search.”53  “The difficulties of operating a detention center 
must not be underestimated by the courts.”54  One difficulty is 
that facilities often know little to nothing about new 
                                              
51 J.B. Br. 27. 
52 Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1520. 
53 Id. at 1521. 
54 Id. at 1515. 
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detainees.  This is a result of many factors.  For example, a 
new detainee might lie about his identity or carry false 
identification when he is arrested.  Any records officers may 
have access to (and they often do not have access to records) 
might be inaccurate upon intake.  The paucity of information 
regarding a new detainee makes it unreasonable for an officer 
to “assume the arrestees in front of them do not pose a risk of 
smuggling something into the facility.”55   
 The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the 
utility of blanket policies in prison administration.  In Bell v. 
Wolfish, the Supreme Court upheld a policy requiring pretrial 
detainees in any correctional facility run by the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons to undergo a strip search after every 
contact visit with a person from outside the institution.56  
Following Bell, the Supreme Court then upheld a ban to all 
contact visits in Block v. Rutherford because of the threat they 
posed.57  The Court found that “[t]here were ‘many 
justifications’ for imposing a general ban rather than trying to 
carve out exceptions for certain detainees.  Among other 
problems, it would be ‘a difficult if not impossible task’ to 
identify ‘inmates who have propensities for violence, escape, 
or drug smuggling.’”58  This problem was exacerbated by the 
“brevity of detention and the constantly changing nature of 
                                              
55 Id.  
56 441 U.S. 520. 
57 468 U.S. 576 (1984). 




the inmate population.”59  In Hudson v. Palmer, the issue was 
whether prison officials could perform random searches of 
inmate lockers and cells even without reason to suspect a 
particular individual of concealing a prohibited item.60  The 
Supreme Court upheld such searches and explained in 
Florence that it “recognized that deterring the possession of 
contraband depends in part on the ability to conduct searches 
without predictable exceptions.”61  This is so, the Court 
explained, because “[i]nmates would adapt to any pattern or 
loopholes they discovered in the search protocol and 
undermine the security of the institution.”62  Thus, any 
argument for an individualized inquiry of new detainees is 
impractical, if not dangerous, given the realities of jail 
administration.     
 Not only is such an inquiry unrealistic, it is also 
vulnerable to abuse.  The Supreme Court warned that “[t]he 
laborious administration of prisons would become less 
effective, and likely less fair and evenhanded,” should an 
individualized inquiry be implemented.63  Classifications 
based on individual characteristics risk discriminatory 
application on the part of officers.  Officers might strip search 
a juvenile based on sex, race, accent, age, or any other 
number of characteristics.  Pressured, “[t]o avoid liability, 
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62 Id. at 1517. 
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officers might be inclined not to conduct a thorough search in 
any close case, thus creating unnecessary risk for the entire 
jail population.”64  Because officers in any detention facility 
have an “essential interest in readily administrable rules,”65 
blanket strip search policies upon admission to the general 
population of a jail, regardless of whether the detainee is a 
juvenile or adult, make good sense.  Any other policy would 
“limit the intrusion on the privacy of some detainees but at 
the risk of increased danger to everyone in the facility.”66  
Thus, to the extent the Supreme Court addressed this type of 
inquiry in rejecting the petitioner’s argument for an exclusion 
for non-serious offenders, we similarly reject Plaintiffs’ 
argument that juveniles are to be excluded, or, moreover, that 
non-serious juvenile offenders be excluded.   
 Finally, we must disagree with Plaintiffs’ assertion that 
the Supreme Court contemplated an exception for juvenile 
detainees.  The Supreme Court acknowledged that “[t]his case 
does not require the Court to rule on the types of searches that 
would be reasonable in instances where, for example, a 
detainee will be held without assignment to the general jail 
population and without substantial contact with other 
detainees.”67  Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts concurred, 
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recognized that to the extent prisoners retain an expectation of 
privacy, that expectation is unreasonable in the face of the 
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reiterating that the “Court is nonetheless wise to leave open 
the possibility of exceptions, to ensure that we ‘not embarrass 
the future.’”68  We do not, however, interpret the Court to 
have contemplated an exception based on age classifications.  
Instead, the exceptions contemplated by the Court appear to 
involve factual scenarios where, for instance, release into the 
general population of the facility is not necessary.69  Thus, it 
is reasonable to believe there are scenarios where a juvenile’s 
release into the general population of a detention facility is 
not necessary.  In such a circumstance, the Supreme Court 
has not ruled on the legality of a strip search and such a 
search may indeed require a reasonable suspicion analysis as 
contemplated in Bell v. Wolfish.70  But this is quite a different 
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69 Id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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the Supreme Court, offense level is a poor way to discern 
whether a detainee presents a risk to the facility.  See 
Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1520 (“People detained for minor 
offenses can turn out to be the most devious and dangerous 
criminals.”).  With that said, the Supreme Court has had no 
occasion to review a case, where, a detainee can be held in 
available facilities removed from the general population and 
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thing than the Court carving out an exception to its holding 
based on the individual characteristics of a detainee, of which 
age is a component.  Given that the security risks are similar 
irrespective of whether the facility hosts adults or juveniles 
and that an individualized inquiry proves unworkable for 
both, we do not believe the Supreme Court contemplated such 
an exception.   
 Furthermore, reading in such an exception would be in 
contrast to the Supreme Court’s use of broad, sweeping 
language.  For example, it defined “jail” in a “broad sense to 
include prisons and other detention facilities.”71  This 
comports with the federal definition of prison: “[A]ny 
Federal, State, or local facility that incarcerates or detains 
juveniles or adults accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or 
adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law.”72  In 
addition, the Court uses adjectives such as “every,” and “all,” 
when describing who will be strip searched.  For instance, “in 
broad terms, the controversy concerns whether every detainee 
who will be admitted to the general population may be 
required to undergo a close visual inspection while 
undressed”73; “[t]here is a substantial interest in preventing 
any new inmate, either of his own will or as a result of 
coercion, from putting all who live or work at these 
institutions at even greater risk when he is admitted to the 
                                                                                                     
we encourage juvenile detention centers to consider other 
options where appropriate.  
71 Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1513.  
72 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g). 
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general population”74; and “[t]he Court holds that jail 
administrators may require all arrestees who are committed to 
the general population of a jail to undergo visual strip 
searches.”75  The only qualification is that the detainee must 
be admitted to the general population.  This is in contrast to 
Safford, where the Supreme Court carefully delineated its 
holding, limiting it to strip searches of minors specifically in 
the school setting.  We see no such carefully drawn 
limitations in Florence, and we cannot honor Plaintiffs’ 
request to read Florence so narrowly as to infer such a 
limitation.       
III. Conclusion 
 “Deference must be given to the officials in charge of 
a jail unless there is ‘substantial evidence’ demonstrating 
their response to the situation is exaggerated.”76  Plaintiffs fail 
to put forth such evidence, and thus we reverse the District 
Court’s order denying Defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment on this claim.  For all of the reasons stated above, 
Florence guides our decision to uphold LYIC’s strip search 
policy of all juvenile detainees admitted to general population 
at LYIC.    
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